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I. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS; 
All parties to this proceeding are set forth in the caption of 
the case. 
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I 
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
i 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(1997). 
< 
^ 
i 
i 
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V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Did the defendant have notice (constructive or otherwise) and 
if so was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny 
defendant/appellant's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) to be relived 
from the July 7, 1997 judgment? 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing the trial court's decision under Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is only reversed if it is 
clearly established that the trial court has abused its discretion. 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1983); Corbett v^ . 
Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d, 384, 386 (Utah 1985); Airkem Intermountain. 
Inc. v^ Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah S.Ct. 1973); Fackrell v^ 
Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah S.Ct.1987). 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Were there procedural errors of defendant's former counsel, 
plaintiff's counsel and the trial court which mandates, as a matter 
of law, that this case should be remanded for further proceedings 
at the trial court level? 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing the trial court's decision under Rule 60(b) of 
2 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is only reversed if it is 
clearly established that the trial court has abused its discretion. 
Kanzee v. Kanzee. 668 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1983); Corbett v. 
Fitzgerald. 709 P.2d, 384, 386 (Utah 1985); Airkem Intermountain. 
Inc. yj. Parker. 513 P.2d 429 (Utah S.Ct. 1973); Fackrell y^ . 
Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah S.Ct.1987). 
3 
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VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) MISTAKES; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc.. On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the Court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. the motion shall be made within 
reasonable time and for reasons (1) (2) (3), or (4), not more than 
three (3) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or take. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not 
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affect the finality of a judgment, or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court, 
the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 55(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure , 
(a) Default 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought ha
 { 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as 
provided by these rules and that fact is made 
to appear, the clerk shall enter his default. i 
(2) Notice to Party in default. After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided 
in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall \ 
not be necessary to give such party in default 
any notice of actions taken or to be taken or 
to serve any notice or paper otherwise i 
required by these rules to be served on a 
party to the action or proceeding, except as 
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in 4 
5 
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the event that it is necessary for the court 
to conduct a hearing with regard to the amount 
of damages of the non-defaulting party. 
Section 78-51-36 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to 
act as such, a party to an action or proceeding for whom he was 
acting as attorney must, before any further proceedings [emphasis 
added] are had against him be required by the adverse party, by 
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in person. 
Rule 4-506 Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an 
attorney may withdraw as counsel of record except when (a) a motion 
has been filed and is pending before the court or (b) a certificate 
of readiness for trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, 
an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the 
court. When an attorney withdraws under circumstances where court 
approval is not required, the notice of withdrawal shall include a 
statement by the attorney that there are no motions pending and 
that no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written 
notice of the withdrawal must be served upon the client of the 
6 
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withdrawing attorney and upon all parties not in default [emphasis 
added] and a certificate of service must be filed with the court. 
If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served upon 
the client shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or i 
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing 
counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented client of 
his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or appear in
 ( 
person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings 
[emphasis added] against the client. A copy of the written notice 
shall be filed with the court and no further proceedings shall be < 
held in the matter until twenty (20) days have elapsed from the 
date of filing. 
i 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Complaint for divorce was filed in Washington County, State 
of Utah, Fifth District Court on or about July 18, 1995 (R.2) . < 
During the process of the divorce litigation, Defendant/Appellant 
first hired Mr. LaMar J. Winward who later withdrew as counsel for 
the Defendant/Appellant in July, 1996. i 
Plaintiff/Appellee through counsel sent a certified letter to 
the Defendant/Appellant advising her to appear in person or obtain 
counsel. That certified letter was unclaimed and returned to < 
7 
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plaintiff's counsel's office on September 13, 1996 (attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A"). 
Defendant/Appellant then hired Mr. Harold J. Dent. 
After extensive litigation, wherein, among other things the 
defendant/appellant refused service of process of an Order to Show 
Cause, and failed to appear at a hearing, the case was set for 
trial by way of notice from the Fifth District Court Clerk's 
office, which was sent to both counsels of record on May 21, 1997. 
The trial was set for Monday June 23, 1997 (R. 172). 
On June 23, 1997, plaintiff/appellee appeared with his 
witnesses and his counsel, Paul R. Christensen. The 
defendant/appellant did not appear for the trial (R. 184). 
Attorney for the defendant/appellant did appear and notified 
the court that his client would not be present and then moved the 
court for leave to withdraw (R. 184). 
Said motion was granted and the court had all the pleadings of 
the defendant/appellant stricken placing her in default (R. 184). 
The court instructed counsel for the plaintiff/appellee to 
take his relief sought as well as attorney's fees and other 
equitable relief (attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference in Exhibit B a copy of the court transcript of the trial 
June 23, 1997). 
The court found that in view of the defendant's recalcitrance 
8 
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in prosecuting the litigation and the difficult times that were 
reflected in the file dictated the relief sought by the 
plaintiff/appellant (R. 185). 
The final order was entered July 7, 1997 (R. 208). 
Defendant sought relief from the Judgment by way of a 60(b) < 
motion and a motion for reconsideration. 
The trial court denied the motion by an order entered December 
19, 1997 (R. 355). i 
An order denying the motion to reconsider was entered January 
21, 1998 (R. 377). 
The bases of defendant/appellant's motion to set aside the i 
default judgment are: 
(1) Defendant claims she did not receive notice of the trial 
until June 20, 1998 at the hour of 4:50 p.m.; i 
(2) She could not appear because of her work schedule; 
(3) Her attorney advised her that she could appear by 
telephone; < 
(4) She did not know it was the final trial (R. 228-229); 
(5) Defendant had a family outing already scheduled for the 
week end prior to trial date. (Exhibit "C", Affidavit of Harold J. \ 
Dent) . 
This appeal arises from the trial court's denial of both the 
60(b) motion and the motion to reconsider. i 
9 
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VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is the position of the plaintiff/appellee that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the 
defendant's motion to set aside the judgment against the 
defendant/appellant. It is clearly within the court's discretion 
to let the judgment stand. Plaintiff/appellee asserts that Rule 
55(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable case law 
govern the instant case before this court. 
The defendant/appellant's position is that the Court of 
Appeals should reverse the case for further proceedings based upon 
mistake, excusable neglect, or surprise pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
Utah R.Civ.P.. The defendant/appellant further asserts that 
plaintiff's counsel had a duty, pursuant to Rule 4-506 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration and Utah Code Ann §78-51-36 to 
advise the defendant that she should appoint or appear in person 
before judgment was rendered. This argument is not well grounded 
in law or fact. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. DEFENDANT HAD EFFECTIVE NOTICE OF THE TRIAL. 
Trial in this case was scheduled on June 23, 1997. 
Defendant's counsel received notice May 21, 1997, of the trial 
scheduled June 23, 1997 (R. 228). Counsel for the 
10 
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defendant/appellant made her aware of the court date on by at least 
the Friday, June 20, 1997, prior to the trial. Defendant asserts 
that her counsel informed her that she would not have to appear (R. 
229). This assertion is disingenuous at best and a fraud upon the 
court at worst. The defendant/cippellant is just not credible based 
upon her past behavior. At a hearing held in May of 1997, the 
trial court made it clear that the case would be set for trial at 
the earliest possible date that could accommodate a one (1) day 
trial. No other hearings were proposed or notices sent to the 
parties or their respective counsels of record. 
Counsel for the defendant makes the argument that the 
defendant had no effective notice of the trial. The defendant 
would have the court believe that although placed on notice the 
Friday before the Monday trial, this was not effective notice and 
that her counsel told her that she need not appear and that she 
could appear telephonically although he was present and asked for 
leave to withdraw at the time and place set for trial (R. 184). 
The trial court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 60 Utah R.Civ.P.. Where any 
reasonable excuse is offered by the defaulting party, courts 
generally favor granting relief from a default judgment unless it 
appears that to do so would result in substantial injustice to the 
11 
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adverse party. (citing Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690f 692 
(1992 Utah App.) and Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 
(Utah 1973)). 
In the instant case, the defendant by way of her own affidavit 
admits to being on notice of the court date scheduled June 23, 
1997. There is no reasonable justification for the defendant not 
to have appeared. Her counsel was present. 
After two years of extensive litigation, a substantial 
injustice would be heaped upon the plaintiff/appellee. 
Additionally, the court made findings that defendant's recalcitrant 
behavior was the basis of the judgment. (See Exhibit B, copy of 
court transcript of June 23, 1997 trial proceedings). 
The defendant in her motion and affidavit asserts that a trial 
on the merits of the case would have resulted in a different 
outcome. It is not appropriate for the court to examine the merits 
of such claims Erickson v. Whenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 
P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). The defendant would have the court 
interpose its decision for that of the trial court and find that it 
is reasonable to believe that: (1) Notice the Friday before trial 
was not effective, although notice had been hand delivered to 
defendant's counsel May 21, 1997; (2) that her attorney told her 
that she need not appear; (3) that he did not advise her that it 
was trial; (4) that she could appear telephonically. 
12 
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Plaintiff/appellee's position is that the facts as presented 
by the defendant/appellant are wholly unreasonable and or not 
sufficient grounds to find that the trial court's decision was an 
abuse of discretion. 
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a 
party from a final judgment under Rule 60(b) (1) U.R.C.P., 
and this court will reverse the trial court only when an 
abuse of discretion is clearly established. The trial 
court must balance two valid considerations: on the one 
hand, to relieve the party of the judgment initiates the 
effects of res judicata and creates a hardship for the 
successful litigant by causing him to prosecute more than 
once his action and subjecting him to the possible loss 
of collecting his judgment. On the other hand, the court 
desires to protect the losing party who has not had the 
opportunity to present his claim or defense. The rule 
that the courts will incline towards granting relief to 
a party who has not had the opportunity to present his 
case, is ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and 
this court will not reverse the determination of the 
trial court merely because the motion could have been 
granted. For this court to overturn the discretion of 
the lower court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment, 
the requirements of public policy demand more than a mere 
statement that a person did not have his day in court 
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded him 
or his legal representative. The movant must show that 
he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control. 
Airkem Intermountain. Inc., v. Parker 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 
S.Ct. 1973). [Emphasis added]. 
In the instant case, the Court advised defendant/appellant in 
May that the trial would be set at the court's earliest possible 
convenience. No other motions or notices of hearing were sent to 
the parties or counsels of record. The Court sent notice of the 
trial setting for June 23, 1997, to both parties' legal 
13 
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representatives. The defendant admits in her affidavit that she 
was notified of the June 23, 1997, date the week before the trial. 
Affidavit of counsel for the defendant specifically states that he 
told her of the date and that they needed to get together to 
prepare for trial. (Attached hereto and incorporated by reference 
as Exhibit C and made a part hereof, Affidavit of Harold J. Dent). 
The defendant refused and told her counsel that she had a family 
outing and that she had to work on the following Monday so that she 
could not be present in court. By these actions of the defendant, 
she does not show due diligence in defending her position, or in 
prosecuting her counter-claim. 
II. NOTICE TO APPOINT COUNSEL OR APPEAR IS INAPPLICABLE 
TO THE INSTANT CASE 
Rule 4-506 of Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and Utah 
Code Annotated §78-51-36 are inapplicable to this case. 
Counsel for the defendant/appellant's position is that on the 
date of trial, counsel for plaintiff/appellee, Mr. Christensen, had 
a duty to protect the defendant and that failure to do so is 
reversible error. Rule 4-506(3) of Utah Code of Jud. Admin, and 
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-36 require that: 
If an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the 
withdrawing attorney must serve written notice of the 
withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing attorney 
and upon all other parties not in default: A Certificate 
of service must be filed with the court. If a trial date 
14 
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has been set, the notice of withdrawal shall include a 
notification of the trial date. [Emphasis added]. 
The court in the instant case struck defendant's pleadings, 
thus placing her in a position of default. This sanction is 
clearly within the discretion of the trial court, based upon the 
Court's making a specific finding of her past recalcitrance and of 
her own failure to appear and defend at the time of trial. 
The language of Rule 4-506 is that "notice of the 
withdrawal... upon all other parties not in default" obviates 
opposing counsel's duty to notify the defendant to appear or 
appoint. The striking of her pleadings, based upon defendant's own 
i 
recalcitrant behavior towards orders of the court, placed her in 
default. Defendant/appellant herself, and no one else, is 
responsible for her default—not her various attorneys, not the 
court, not opposing counsel, and not plaintiff, although all were 
victimized by her costly pattern of no-shows, refusals to 
cooperate, and other recalcitrant behavior, as incorporated in the 
i 
Court's findings in rendering her pleadings stricken and her cause 
defaulted. 
Counsel for defendant/appellant goes on to argue that it is 
plaintiff's counsel's responsibility to stop the trial and file the 
notice to appoint or appear and that no further proceedings shall 
be held until twenty (2 0) days after service of the notice to 
< 
appear or appoint. This is wholly inapplicable to the instant 
15 
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case. The date for trial had come. The proceeding had commenced. 
No further proceedings were scheduled. The court struck the 
pleadings of defendant/appellant as indicated above and directed 
counsel for the plaintiff/appellee to take his judgment. The 
applicable law in the instant case is governed by Rule 55(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
A) DEFAULT 
(1) ENTRY. When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought ha 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as 
provided by these rules and that fact is made 
to appear, the clerk shall enter his default. 
(2) NOTICE TO PARTY IN DEFAULT. After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided 
in Subdivision (a) (1) of this rulef it shall 
not be necessary to give such party in default 
any notice of actions taken or to be taken or 
to serve any notice or paper otherwise 
required by these rules to be served on a 
party to the action or proceeding, except as 
provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in 
the event that it is necessary for the court 
to conduct a hearing with regard to the amount 
of damages of the non-defaulting party. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Rule 55(a) of Utah R.Civ.P. is clear. Once a party is found 
in default there is no reason for counsel for the opposing party to 
serve any paper whatsoever upon the defaulting party. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in refusing 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to set aside the default judgment against defendant/appellant. The 
applicable Utah State law in the instant case is well settled. The 
Appellate Court must first establish that the trial court clearly 
abused its discretion in failing to set aside a judgment taken by 
default. Merely because the trial court could relieve the 
defendant/appellant from judgment is permissive only, not 
mandatory. The trial court, being aware of all the facts in the 
instant case, may relieve a party from judgment by default, but as 
a matter of law, if no good cause is shown, it is not mandated to 
do so. The defendant/appellant, not plaintiff/appellee, must show 
due diligence, and that her failure to defend was caused by 
circumstances over which she had no control. Defendant has 
demonstrated no due diligence whatsoever, nor any other good cause, 
for her failure to appear and defend at the properly noticed trial 
which she was too busy to attend. 
Defendant/appellant's reliance on Rule 4-506 of the U.R.J.A. 
and U.C.A. §78-51-36 is not well founded. Rule 55(a) of U.R.C.P. 
is the appropriate statute that governs this case. The trial was 
set. Notice was full, timely, and proper in all respects. The 
defendant/appellant failed to appear. The pleadings were stricken 
and the defendant/appellant was found to be recalcitrant towards 
the orders of the court. No notice or paper whatsoever needs to be 
served upon the defendant/appellant once placed in default. 
17 
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Therefore, the defendant/appellantfs appeal should be 
dismissed and costs and attorneys fees should be awarded to 
plaintiff/appellee. 
Respectfully submitted this 
1997. 
\5 k+k day of 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
s \ 
Vv* 
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellee 
18 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the // day of September, 1998, 
I mailed two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing , 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, by placing same in the United States Mail, 
first-class postage prepaid, to the following, to wit: 
Samuel Draper 
HUGHES & READ 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
CLAXTONXHUNTSMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
Appellant 
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ORDER FROM PRECISION BUSINESS FORMS (800) 231-6739 
I 
Delivery Notice/Reminder/Receipt 
3 part Delivery Notice Form 3849, May 1994 
5 0
 : 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(M«l3 V - - N xV \y 
Paul R. Chriscansen 
Accor-^^ nev :or Plaintiff 
HUNTSMAN AND CHRISTENSEN 
233 West Hilton Drive 
St. George, Utah 347-Q 
Phone: (SOI) 523-2345 
:N THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
JOHN ANTHONY LoPORTC 
Plaintiff 
vs . 
LUCY ZUNIGA LoPORTO, 
Defendanc 
NOTICE TO APPOINT COUNSEI 
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
TO APPEAR IN PERSON 
Civil No. 954500424 
TO THE DEFENDANT: You are hereby notified that LaiMar J. 
winward has wichdrawn as attorney for defendant in the above-
entitled matter. Pursuant to Section 73-51-31 of the Utah lede 
Annotated (1953) as amended, you are hereby given notice to 
aoooint another attornev to act for vcu in the above-entitled 
action, or to appear m person to defend said action. 
DATED this ~X 5 of JpuJU~ , 1996. 
Paul R. Christensen 
Attornev for Plaintiff 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this A'-15 dav of Uy-. 
1996, I did mail a true and correct copy of this above and 
foregoing document, by placing the same in the United States 
mail, first class postage prepaid, to the following, to wit: 
Mrs. Lucy Hoegemann fka 
Lucy Zuniga LoPorto 
2200 South Fort Apache, =1154 
Las Vecras, NV 8 9117 
:recafV / 
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uiVf; 
IN THE DISTRICT 
IN 
JOHN A. 
LUCY Z 
AND FOR THE 
. LOPORTO, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
COURT 
COUNTY 
r 
OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
HON. 
. (LOPORTO) HOEGEMANN, 
Defendant. 
JAMES L. SHUMATE, judge 
) Civil No. 954500424 
) (Videotaped Proceedings; 
REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Monday, June 23, 1997 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL; 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
BY: PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ. 
283 West Hilton Drive, Suite 3 
St. George, Utah 84770 
SCARTH & DENT 
BY: HAROLD J. DENT, ESQ. 
150 North 200 East, Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
P.O. BOX 1534 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84771 
ran n 674. m i 
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ST. GEORGE, UTAH; MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1997 
-oOo-
THE COURT: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. 
The record will reflect that today is the 23rd day of June, 
1997, and the hour is 9:03 A.M. 
Two matters are on the calendar for a hearing on 
this morning's date. The first one is Loporto versus 
Loporto. The file number there is 954500424. 
Mr. Loporto is present. His counsel, 
Mr. Christensen, is also present. 
Counsel, I am informed by Mr. Dent, through the 
clerk's office, that he does not have his client here, 
intends to ask leave of the Court to withdraw, and based 
upon that, would basically leave this matter in a position 
of entering a default. 
Is that your understanding as well? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's my understanding, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Here comes Mr. Dent right now, so 
I'll stop talking for him and let him say it himself. 
Mr. Dent, I just put on the record the 
information that was conveyed to me in Loporto that 
indicated that your client was not here. That you had 
difficulty, apparently, in-your relationship with the 
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3 
client and had asked leave to withdraw in Loporto. 
Is that correct, Counsel? 
MR. DENT: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Your motion to withdraw 
is granted. The pleadings of the defendant are ordered 
stricken. 
Mr. Christensen, you may take your relief 
sought, and you may take attorney's fees as well. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. My one 
concern is — is that there's a retirement fund in this 
particular matter. And under the Woodward v. Woodward, the 
defendant would be entitled to one half of that. However, 
based upon the facts that we haven't received child support 
or any of the other costs such as medical care or child 
care, we would be seeking for having her waive any 
entitlement to that retirement. 
THE COURT: Counsel, the Court, in view of this 
defendant's recalcitrance in prosecuting this litigation, 
the difficult times that this file shows that have gone on 
through this manner, I think the equities in the case 
firmly support the award of the entire retirement fund. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So you may draft your pleadings 
accordingly, and I'll sign them. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: - Thank you, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
MR. DENT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public duly qualified in and 
for the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing matter, to wit, JOHN A. 
LOPORTO VS. LUCY Z. (LOPORTO) HOEGEMANN, CIVIL NO. 
•t-'r-J' 
954500424, was videotaped at the time and place therein 
named and thereafter, to the best of my listening and 
understanding, reduced to computerized transcription. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 2nd day of 
December, 1997. 
PAUL G. fteMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
NOTARv prjBUC 
PAUL3.?XMULUN 
4?3>o;^ 50 West Circle 
£" " r>'?3. UT 3*770 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 3-17-9A \^W»vsS/ ^SS^SHSST 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah \ 0^:-j% 
STATE OF UTAH 
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/F> nPY 
IN TKZ FIT 
IN AND FOR WAS 
IK JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
KINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAI 
JOHN A. LOPORTO, ) 
Plaintiff/ ) 
vs. ) 
LUCY Z.(LOPORTO), KOEGEMANN, ) 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
HAROLD J. DENT, JR. 
CASE NO. 354500424 
Honorable James L. 
STA.TE OF UTAH ) 
£3 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
COMES NOW HAROLD J. DENT, JR., who having been 
upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That I am a licensed attorney practising in 
Utah, and formerly represented Mrs. Hcegemann, the Defendant 
above -entitled action. 
2. That I uncertcc/: this case after my predecescr ?.i 
considerable work en behalf of Mrs. Hcegemann. 
3. That Mrs. Hcegemann was never satisfied with 
that was done on her behalf as indicated in my letter : 
dated July 17, 199", a ccpy of which is attached heret: 
incorporated herein by reference as EXHIBIT A. 
4. That Mr. Christensen and I had worked 
out a resolution of the issues and reach a st: 
chat would save our clients time and mc-nev. 
sworn 
:ne wcr 
;j_ j. j ^ci.i / 
- z^r* c ^ r 
wcr, 
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5. That on several cccassicns I presented a proposed 
agreement to Mrs. Hoegemann to which she would agree and 
subsequently decide that certain of the terms were unacceptable. 
6. That on May 23, 1997, at an Order to Show Cause, certain 
matters were heard and resolved by the Court and it was determined 
that an early trial setting was needed although I don't recall 
whether or not a specific date was set in open court. 
7. That in fact a trial date was set for June 22, I9S7, and 
notice of that setting (dated two day prior to the Order to Show 
Cause) was provided to me and Mr. Chirstensen. A copy of the 
Court's notice is attached hereto and incorporated herein cy 
reerence as EXHI3ZT 3. 
3. That during the interval between May 22, 1997, and right 
up to the date of trial Mr. Christensen and I continued to work en 
( 9.) That it is our office procedure to forward all notices of 
Court dates to our clients and my asssumption is that the Notice 
acpearing as EXHIBIT 3 was sent to Mrs. Hoegemann; however, I am 
not certain of that fact. 
10. That my associate in cur Kanao office also worked on a 
negotiated settlement in an effort to obviate the necessity or 
trial. A copy of one of her letters to Mr. Christensen is attacr.ee 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference as ZXHI3IT C. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11. That Mrs. Hoegemann was not pleased with Ms. Jchnstcne's 
efforts on her behalf and Ms. Johnstone came to the conclusion 
nothing mere could be cone to please her. 
12. That I filed a Motion to Continue the trial date, which 
motion was denied. 
13. That during the week preceeding the trial date I was in 
another jurisdiction in northern Utah and returned on thursday 
whereupon I called Mrs. Hoegemann to arrange a meeting time ever 
the week-end for trial preparation. Mrs. Hoegemann informed me she 
would be unable to meet with me because of a family outing and 
further, that she would be unavailable for the trial because of her 
work schedule. She denied having received notice of the trial. 
14. That during my phone conversation with Mrs. Hoegemann we 
discussed the most recent settlement proposal, which I did 
recommend. At that time she, fir the first time tc my knowledge 
insisted that vehicles owned by the parties be sold and the 
proceeds divided. It was as if we were right on the verge of 
settlement until this new demand was put forward and we were back 
to scuare one. 
'ir, ) inat i aaam aspect Mrs. Hcecemann sceciiicai-v it sne 
would meet for trial preparation and make arrangements to attend 
trial and her reply was that she would not. I told her I would 
speak to Mr. Christensen again about a resolution ana would appear 
at court. 
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0.6.') That: Mr. Christensen and I spoke an lease twice di 
the week-end prior to trial but could not reach agreement b^ c 
of the recalcitrance of my client. I advised Mr. Chris tenser, c 
intent to ask the Court for permission to withdraw. 
17. That I appeared in Court on June 23, 1397, or: 
explained that I was unable to work with my client and recue 
permission to withdraw which was granted. 
DATED this 4J[_ day of October, 1997. 
^>^n r / HAR£S5^jy DENT, 
SL3SCR-5ED ana sworn to before me in i s <£> / da y c - N c vemc e r, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expi res : <?/cWc^c / 
VICX! LASSWELL 
HOfTAFYPVBUC • STATEdVPH 
160 NORTH 200 EAST 
ST. GECRGE. \JT 14720 
CCMM. EXP. 9-21-2001 
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